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Introduction 
A “science of the life-world” – this is a frequently occuring call in Husserl’s phenomenology, 
not only in the Crisis
1
 but also in the Ideas
2
 and several other writings. But taken too literally, 
this call can easily be misunderstood, whether in the literal sense of a special “science” with 
the life-world as its object, or as a philosophical “theory of the life-world,” i.e. a philosophical 
investigation of what represents the life-world. But this understanding misses the original 
phenomenological aim – an aim that is, especially in the Crisis, entangled with Husserl’s 
motivation to make visible the hidden presuppositions in everyday life and scientific praxis. 
From this misunderstanding, the suspicion may arise that, with this call, Husserl aspired to 
something impossible. 
In my contribution, I will sketch these possible misreadings of a “science of the life-world” 
and show how phenomenology masters this challenge in its own way. First, I will sketch the 
meaning and motivation of Husserl’s call for a “science of the life world.” Then I will show 
that some essential characteristics of the life-world are not adequately dealt with by these 
misreadings of the project. If it is possible to grasp the life-world at all, it is best achieved in 
literature by self-reflection and representation, and that this is a tool that literature shares with 
phenomenology.
3
 
The “life-world” in phenomenology 
We find the most famous occurrence of the term “life-world” in Husserl’s Crisis. There he 
argues that science has lost its Lebensbedeutsamkeit, i.e. its meaning for life.
4
 Although 
science continues to further knowledge and technological progress, it has lost its sense for the 
deeper relation between human beings and the process of converting phenomena into 
potential research topics. Science has forgotten its dependence on the human sphere; it 
exchanges the sensible world with an abstract sphere of models and calculation. So the focus 
must turn to the human sphere again in order to regain, on the one hand, a sense of 
responsibility, and on the other hand, a grasp of that essential characteristic of the human 
being that is most relevant for science, namely, the epistemological capacity. 
The human sphere is characterized by space and time as well as by sensibility. But what 
actually makes it the human “life-world” (and not only “world” as a sum of entities) is the 
systematic frame of meanings, constituted by the human mind. Husserl famously describes 
this frame in terms of “soil” and “horizon.” The life-world is the “totality” of everything we 
can refer to, including ourselves and our attitudes towards ourselves,
5
 and it is the sphere of 
that attitude that Husserl calls the “natural” one. 
The motivation of a “science of the life-world” can be paraphrased with the Husserlian motto 
of turning self-evident premises into something understandable (verständlich).6 What is not 
yet understood, but which can be made understandable, must be something that is usually 
hidden, something we usually do not think about and that seems “self-evident” in the literal 
sense. There are certain things, opinions and valuations which seem absolutely clear to us. 
They are “self-evident,” meaning instantly understandable. They even establish a certain 
authority as a result of our habitual use of them. Although we may, in some exceptional cases, 
discover that this authority lacks foundation and can be destroyed, usually we are entangled in 
them, in accordance with their own dynamic. Even after having been examined critically, they 
may re-establish themselves, whether justified or not. 
Now this is connected to the call for a foundation of science that takes into consideration 
those presuppositions that make science a well-working business, but which obscure the 
important questions, like the need for a responsible handling of scientific results, the 
evaluation of scientific research with regard to human life, and the question concerning the 
source of all scientific insights (as the condition of the possibility of knowledge). Especially 
in the Crisis, Husserl’s project of a phenomenology as Erkenntniskritik aims to revise the 
earlier scientific and philosophical tradition and redeem the foundation of apodictic 
knowledge. 
Misreadings of a “science of the life-world” 
But in light of the striking title, “science of the life-world,” the life-world cannot be the object 
of a scientific discipline in the sense of what Husserl calls a “natural science” (every non-
transcendental discipline) for two reasons. First, every scientific discipline constitutes itself by 
the limitation of its scope. It chooses a certain aspect of the totality of the world to focus on – 
for example, sociology focuses on social phenomena, psychology on the human psyche, and 
physics on natural laws. They describe the totality of the world from their particular 
perspective. But the totality itself cannot be such a topic. The second reason is that every 
special discipline is, according to Husserl, constituted on the basis of the natural attitude. So, 
in contrast to Husserl’s motivation of avoiding every unreflected presupposition, they work on 
the ground of the epistemological prejudice that the world is given in the way it appears. They 
do not question the notion of world, even though this question is necessary for a profound 
understanding of our relation to it and therefore of the life-world itself. “Life-world” has 
indeed become a catchword in various disciplines. Education researchers, sociologists, and 
historians speak of “the life-world of children,” “the life-world of the ancestors” and so on. 
But their use of this expression raises many questions that are not essential to Husserl, for 
example: Do I have my own life-world, and does somebody else have another? Do animals, 
too, have life-worlds? What about differences in age and sex? In their understanding, life-
world is not the topic itself but rather a designation of certain aspects of the local topics of 
singular disciplines, focused on a narrow interest.  
Even in philosophical methodology, to speak of world in a phenomenologically adequate way 
is problematic. It requires focusing not only on singular aspects in light of their background, 
but also on the background itself. This includes not only things within the world, but the 
world as a whole with its relations and features. Examples of the examination of singular 
aspects are questions like: “What is an action?”; “What is shared intention?” In contrast, 
“What is world?” does not fit into the same category: It focuses on the whole, not merely on 
parts of it, and addresses in particular problems of self-reference. Whereas aspects are usually 
analyzed against an unquestioned background, here the background itself becomes 
questionable. The problem, however, is that one cannot focus on one thing without losing 
sight of something else. In other words, we will never completely avoid unreflected 
presuppositions – even if they are unreflected for a single moment when they provide the 
basis for another center of attention. There will always be a blind spot, which is unacceptable 
to the phenomenological approach.  
An alternative option appears in the specification of the world of lived experience as everyday 
life. The life-world is obviously the sphere of everyday praxis, and therefore the sphere of 
hidden presuppositions, i.e. self-evidences. But the life-world is not exhausted by descriptions 
of life-world phenomena. Providing such descriptions according to a theoretical demand is 
possible, but it depends on a larger context in which the descriptions are embedded. 
Otherwise, a mere description of the topic is in danger of becoming trivial. The insight that 
the life-world is the totality of everything we encounter in it, and that every praxis is based on 
hidden presuppositions, is well known in the practical sphere, and so are the presuppositions 
themselves. This alone is not adequate for theoretical knowledge. 
Examples include the analysis of everydayness in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and 
Alfred Schütz’s systematization of life-world phenomena in Structures of the life-world. Both 
analyses only work in light of a broader theoretical approach, that is, in the case of Heidegger, 
fundamental ontology, and, in the case of Schütz, the ascription of every life-world 
phenomenon to action and a stock of knowledge (Wissensvorrat). And they provide an 
insightful description of the mechanisms of self-evidence, without resulting in a trivial list of 
everyday self-evidences, but instead an understanding of what makes them self-evident in the 
first place. They open many phenomenologically relevant questions like: Which mechanisms 
lead to the latent acknowledgement of potentially problematic premises and make us ignore 
even dangerous side-effects of this pragmatic thoughtlessness? (This point is especially 
important in the critique of technology.) And what does this say about our partially conscious, 
partially unconscious relation to the world? But their far-reaching theoretical presuppositions 
are not acceptable from a strict Husserlian view, even if they are explicated. And the 
presuppositions are inevitable. As Hans Blumenberg remarks: “Taken by themselves, the 
descriptions of everydayness are merely interesting, inspiring, but theoretically functionless. 
Both sides profit from the comparison between life-world and everydayness only in light of 
the function for that which is to be understood.”7 
The appellative character of literature and phenomenology 
Now which options remain? An approach that essentially deals with the life-world, but in a 
way that is very different from the scientific, is literature. Like philosophy, literature mediates 
everything through language, which is at the same time one of the most important media in 
everyday life. But different from a literally taken “science” or “theory of the life-world,” it 
grasps the totality and avoids the risk of trivialization. In the case of a felicitous literary work, 
you can hardly defy the power of literary speech, its suggestive valuations, emotionally-laden 
descriptions, its urging of the reader to position herself in relation to the work and take a stand 
in relation to her own conception of the world. Perhaps this reveals an essential difference 
between literature and science with regard to their aims and demands. The task of philosophy 
is to formulate problems, develop adequate descriptions in precise terms, and provide 
discussable theses. The aim in presenting a theoretical claim is to explicate thoughts as clearly 
as possible and to avoid misunderstanding. Ideally, there is minimal space for interpretation, 
for the duty to make oneself understood ought to leave no ambivalence or ambiguity. In 
contrast, literature defines itself as an art and therefore has a kind of fool’s license. It is not 
obligated to “tell the truth,” and it does not pretend to tell us something we don’t know from 
our life-world. Instead, literature moves on the same ground as our life-world understanding 
of things. 
Herein lies also the reason for its ability to grasp the life-world in its totality. Its use of 
everyday language means everything is present that we know from the life-world sphere. As 
Heidegger observes, language always already carries with it a fundamental understanding of 
the world. But whereas science and theory work with an artificially concise terminology, 
literature uses language in a way we all know and understand from our own experience. The 
reader is able to understand intuitively. She has the required background knowledge from the 
life-world and not from theoretical reflection, like in science where every understanding 
depends on shared presuppositions, i.e. scientific paradigms. Simultaneously, literature offers 
an eye-opening access to the life-world by bearing a peculiar effect on our worldview, i.e. on 
the deeply-anchored, widely-unarticulated knowledge of life by interrelating the concrete 
description of a particular case with the experience of the reader.  
Here, knowledge is gained by occupying a kind of meta-level. As readers, we are put into an 
observer’s position, where we are able to look at, from the outside, our own life-world with its 
self-evidences, prejudices, and inconspicuous attitudes. By shifting our perspective, we are 
shown what we usually ignore. This means that the special ability of literature lies in 
demonstrating, making life understandable, and bringing life into view in the first place. Here 
the difficult topic of the life-world is captured; the phenomena are not explicated, but fixed to 
an observation from an artificially produced distance. In other words, literature is able to 
facilitate an understanding of our life that goes beyond the pragmatic view of daily living. It 
helps us think about things that we might have not thought about before; it even appears to 
articulate some kind of knowledge or wisdom, and allow us to thematize that which usually 
remains beyond our theoretical reach. 
The literary style of making implicit presuppositions visible to the reader by letting her see 
her own “self-evidences” from an artificial distance, thereby opening a path to self-analysis, 
shares something in common with Husserl’s phenomenology, but in a methodological sense. 
Husserl provides explanations that fulfill the demands of a theoretical analysis and at the same 
time calls upon the reader’s personal experience and access to evidence. The programmatic 
character of his approach can be understood as a guide to apodicticity. By developing the 
methods of epoché and eidetic variation and directing them to a mutual aim, he provides the 
tools for all further phenomenological research. In this sense, phenomenology is not mainly 
defined by its results but by its techniques and their careful application. This means at the 
same time that Husserl’s method cannot do without the phenomenologist’s field of 
experience, which is the source of evidence.  
Like literature, phenomenology has an appellative character, which calls the reader back to 
her own pre-theoretical understanding of the life-world. So phenomenology combines the 
intuitive access to what we already know with the demands of a stringent theoretical method. 
The peculiarity of this approach is a scientific implementation of a seemingly a-theoretical 
procedure. It makes the implicit explicit, and puts self-evidences into a theoretical frame 
where they can be understood, i.e. discussed. But whereas literature, as a result of its special 
form, avoids trivialization and strong theoretical premises, phenomenology lets us see what 
we already know, but after the change of perspective by the Epoché. The knowledge that 
emerges from the phenomenological reduction necessarily cannot be trivial, because the 
natural attitude that is left in the Epoché is a necessary condition for triviality. At the same 
time, it amounts not merely to a stocktaking of those things we already know, but ultimately a 
fundamental understanding of their interdependence and totality, and of how we deal with 
them. By means of the appellative character in literature, the totality of the life-world 
becomes present. This is also a requirement for the Epoché, where the whole scope of the 
natural attitude is bracketed. 
Conclusion 
The demarcation against objective science and the comparison to literature now shows the 
peculiarity of the phenomenological path. As seen above, the life-world has two essential 
characteristics, namely, totality and self-evidence. The latter is a feature of the practical 
sphere of science as well as everyday-life. Mere description and systematization of the 
corresponding phenomena will miss totality and risk trivialization. The heuristic challenge 
consists in explicitly replacing the usual perspective with a second perspective that is higher 
in accordance with its own supply of presuppositions: One must at least keep in mind what 
has gone out of focus. So there is no theoretical way to focus on the totality “from the 
outside.” Phenomenology gains instead a performative character by the method of the 
phenomenological reduction, the bracketing of everything that is based on the “natural” view 
of the world. Knowledge is mediated by instruction concerning what to do to achieve 
evidence. The “user” of phenomenology is guided beyond this most familiar mindset. 
The method itself represents, then, a completely artificial praxis that accounts to itself for its 
epistemological basis. So this praxis is fundamentally different from those of science or the 
life-world, but simultaneously opens the view “from the inside.” This kind of representation is 
similar to the case of literature where the reader connects her own experience with the object 
of the text and is able to watch herself from this artificial distance. The phenomenologist who 
carries out this method is aware of this artificiality and can analyze her own perception of the 
world – and therefore gets to the basis of the constitution of the life-world (which depends on 
our perception of the world and how we deal with it). This exceptional perspective provides 
exactly the kind of self-questioning that is able to subvert the kind of illegitimate self-
evidence in science that Husserl attacks in the Crisis, whether it arises from the thoughtless 
following of a set tradition, or the authority of a scientific norm.  
Thus, phenomenology itself can be paraphrased as a science of the life-world, but not in the 
reductive sense that life-world would be its main concern. The problem of the life-world, as 
Husserl says in § 33 of the Crisis, has instead an ancillary role in the foundation of science; 
and its treatment is deeply rooted in the phenomenological method itself. From this point of 
view, Husserl’s call for a “science of the life-world” serves to overcome the crisis in science 
and our relation to it and appears as a task that, in the end, might let us further explore the 
boundaries of theory. 
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